Ölpreiszerfall ist Ausdruck eines massiven Überangebots

Sehr geehrte Medienschaffende

ÖLPREISZERFALL IST AUSDRUCK EINES MASSIVEN WELTWEITEN ÜBERANGEBOTS

Shinwoo Kim, Energy Equity Analyst bei T. Rowe Price

Andrew Jamison, High Yield Credit Analyst bei T. Rowe Price

Der Ölpreis ist derzeit so tief wie seit mehr als zehn Jahren nicht mehr. Während die kurzfristigen Verkäufe durch die gleichzeitige Volatilität der globalen Aktien- und Kapitalmärkte noch zusätzlich angekurbelt wurden, wird der Abwärtstrend von fundamentalen Nachfragedaten getrieben, wie der überraschenden Widerstandskraft der US-Schieferöl-Produktion, dem Entscheid der OPEC-Länder (allen voran Saudi-Arabien), die Produktion nicht zu drosseln, um die Preise zu stützen, und dem bevorstehenden vollumfänglichen Wiedereintritt des Irans in den Weltmarkt.

Angesichts dieser Belastungen glaubt T. Rowe Price, dass der Ölpreis pro Barrel deutlich unter 30 USD fallen muss, um die Nachfrage wieder mit dem Angebot in Einklang zu bringen - ein Szenario, auf das auch der Markt zunehmend zu setzen scheint. Weitere Preissenkungen würden deutlich spürbare negative Auswirkungen für Emittenten von Energie-Investments, Anleger und Banken nach sich ziehen und die Rating-Agenturen würden ihre Einschätzungen der Sicherheiten und Kreditqualität neu bewerten.

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- "Oil price declines reflect massive global oversupply"

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OIL PRICE DECLINES REFLECT MASSIVE GLOBAL OVERSUPPLY

Shinwoo Kim, Energy Equity Analyst at T. Rowe Price

Andrew Jamison, High Yield Credit Analyst at T. Rowe Price

Since mid-2015, major oil benchmarks have fallen roughly 50%, completely erasing the modest recovery seen after the dramatic price collapse of 2014. As of mid-January, the major benchmark grades were flirting with the $30 per barrel level, amid widespread expectations that they could fall even lower. This renewed pressure reflected a steady stream of bearish news, including:

• The relative resilience of U.S. shale production amid lower prices, even as drilling activity has collapsed. While U.S. field production is down about 5% from its mid- 2015 peak, output is still higher than it was at the end of 2014-and up nearly a third from the end of 2012.
• The determination of Saudi Arabia and other major OPEC countries to maintain market share. The Saudi strategy of accepting a price war with U.S. shale and other non-OPEC producers was confirmed by OPEC's failure to set a production target at the group's December meeting.
• Expectations for a surge in oil exports by Iran following the lifting of nuclear sanctions. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that Iranian exports could rise by half a million barrels per day (bbl/d) by the end of 2016.

• Downward revisions to 2016 demand forecasts as China's growth continues to slow and the consumption impact of last year's price declines fades. The IEA has projected that global demand growth will slow to 1.2 million bbl/d this year, down from 2015's 1.8 million bbl/d.

• A sharp rise in global inventories, which have reached levels not seen since the early 1990s. Given the supply/demand fundamentals, we think OECD inventories could soon meet or exceed the mid-1980s peak of 70 to 72 days

The persistence of U.S. shale supply in the face of sharp price declines has featured large in our analysis for some time. Our view has been that cost declines in the oil services industries, coupled with rising per-well productivity, would partially offset the impact of lower prices on supply, at least for core U.S. shale oil producers.

This scenario appears to be playing out now. While exploration and drilling activities have slowed considerably, prices remain above operating costs for many U.S. shale producers, giving them an economic incentive to maintain current production. More of this supply pressure has been steered directly to global markets by the lifting of the U.S. ban on oil exports, which has largely eliminated the price premium on Brent crudes.

COSTS ARE A MOVING TARGET

Although U.S. production has flattened, the market increasingly understands that even the price declines seen since mid-2015 may not be enough to trigger a major supply correction in the shale sector. This has been our own view for some time, based on our recognition that production costs are a (downwardly) moving target, driven by both cyclical and structural factors.

On the cost side, while U.S. shale exploration and drilling costs are down roughly 30% from their peak, we believe there is considerable room for them to fall further. If one assumes industry employment levels that decline in line with productivity growth, and wages that return to their long-term average levels relative to the broad economy, operating costs for many core shale producers theoretically could drop as low as $30 per barrel.

But cyclical cost declines are only part of the story. Productivity (barrels of production per active drilling rig) has been rising at an average 40% to 50% annual rate in the major U.S. shale regions. Those improvements are structural, not cyclical, and they continue to drive break-even prices lower-not just for current production, but for capital spending decisions as well. Our recent discussions with non-U.S., non OPEC producers also have found relative optimism about costs and surprisingly robust commitments to ongoing and scheduled capital projects. This is partly driven by a stronger U.S. dollar, as costs for many major producers (Russian and Canadian, in particular) are set in local currency terms.

A WORLD AWASH IN CRUDE

Given our global supply and demand projections, our price model suggests that even without any U.S. supply growth, the global oil market will remain oversupplied through the end of the decade. Our base case scenario assumes:

• Flat OPEC production (unlikely with Iran and, possibly, Libya fully returning to the global market)
• Above-trend demand growth of 1.2 million bbl/d per year, and
• No global recession.

All this suggests that prices will need to fall further-and relatively quickly-to choke off excess supply. Although our expectation is that a dip below $30 per barrel will prove temporary, a decline to cash operating costs- wherever they may currently lie-is the necessary precondition for a sustainable recovery to more "normal" price levels, perhaps in the $50 to $60 range. Accordingly, the faster the bottom is reached, the sooner a recovery can begin. The process may be volatile, however, as marginal producers shut down and capacity is liquidated.

MORE PAIN FOR THE ENERGY DEBT MARKET

The sharp drop in oil prices, and the prospect that further declines still may lie ahead, has obvious negative implications for the corporate bond market, already hard hit by the deflation in commodity prices. While approximately one-third of U.S. energy firms failed during the oil bust of the 1980s, higher leverage ratios and weaker balance sheets today lead us to suspect that as many as half of all oil and gas debt issuers could be forced into some kind of restructuring over the next two years.

The coming six months may see the most intense pain for issuers and investors. In April, U.S. bank l enders will revalue their estimates of the collateral (chiefly, proven oil reserves) securing loans to oil and gas producers. Many lenders are already under pressure from regulators to reduce exposure to low-quality borrowers, so any further declines in collateral values would likely lead them to call in their lines of credit. Given that bank loans sit highest in the capital structure, subordinated debt would immediately be at increased risk of default.

Meanwhile, the major credit rating agencies are lowering the oil price assumptions in their revenue and earnings models. This has already generated a wave of issuer downgrades, which could intensify in the coming months. Although the rating agencies are unlikely to bring their price assumptions fully down to market levels, most are still projecting $40 to $50 per barrel oil in 2016, and $50 to $60 in 2017, which leaves plenty of room for further reductions, in our view.

For many bond holders, the risks are heightened by the fact that they may have little or no recovery potential in the event of default. The preponderance of energy high yield issues in recent years have been unsecured, often with very loose covenants or rules protecting bondholders. This means that companies that have access to secured second-lien financing may be able to use the potential impact of that financing on recovery values to pressure existing bondholders into exchanging their bonds at substantial discounts to the original face value.

PLAYING FOR TIME

With yields on high yield energy issues averaging almost 600 basis points (six percentage points) higher than the broad market at the end of 2015, much bad news clearly has been built into valuations. Indeed, energy spreads now are roughly twice what they were at the depths of the last oil price crash in the late 1990s. At some point, this yield pickup will become too attractive for high yield investors to ignore, especially as the sector is cleansed of weaker credits and absorbs relatively high-quality issuers that have fallen out of the investment-grade market.

That time, however, has not yet arrived, in our view. With credit fundamentals still deteriorating, and liquidity conditions fragile at best, caution is warranted. We expect 2016 to be a year of volatility and bottom testing, offering select bargains but also considerable risks.

However, if oil prices do fall far enough to shut off excess supply, energy issues could prove an interesting place to invest in 2017. Oil and gas producers-leveraged both to any rebound in prices and to continued cost reductions and productivity gains-appear best positioned to benefit. But in-depth credit analysis will remain critical to identifying excess return opportunities and to managing risk.

-ENDE-

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